clippings assembled. Managers became aware of external social and political trends in a new and more comprehensive way. Now, issue management also appears to be taking an initial look inward at corporate objectives for its role in achieving the firm's competitive success. The result is an additional approach to issue management which can be called "competitive cooperation": competitive, because a company's issue management performance will have a material impact on its competitiveness, measured by achievement of corporate goals; cooperative, because diverse issue agendas require issue-by-issue coalition building, even with traditional adversaries.
Each element of "competitive cooperation" influences the other. The competitive impulse drives a corporation to assess the impact of an issue more carefully. This helps the firm define how it differs politically from other firms and institutions. Ironically, this also frees the firm to cooperate more with others in connection with issue-specific coalitions. It is no longer locked into broad ideological positions on issues such as the relative roles of the public and private sectors or the appropriateness of government regulation. A firm, with precisely defined business-related goals, possesses greater maneuverability to form coalitions. It has given itself negotiating room by arriving at a better understanding of its core interests, thus narrowing the number of issues on which it feels compelled to stand firm.
Cooperation is further enhanced because competition will be less direct in the future as more firms locate and exploit sheltered niches in the marketplace. "It's a huge horizon, so head-on, face-to-face competition is not what it once was, " a top chemical industry executive observed. l Increasingly, firms will be competing against their own performance goals rather than directly against each other. Finally, a competitive approach to issue management implies that it is no longer sufficient -nor even appropriate -to prevail on all the political or legal points. Instead, issue management programs must chart a course of action through our nation's mixed economy which will enhance achievment of the firm's strategic goals. This may involve parrying an immediate political issue in order to achieve more substantial long-term gains. As a chemical industry CEO said of hazardous waste clean-up, "we decided a year ago to stop arguing and clean up the damn dumps, because it was bothering people."2 Cooperation with traditional adversaries, rather than legal and political battles over clean-up responsibility, is being adopted by some companies to deal with this issue.
This article illustrates the emergence of "competitive cooperation" by examining two companies which, since 1980, underwent strategic repositioning, added greater focus on their issue management programs, and adopted a cooperative approach to issue management. The two companies are Gulf Oil Corporation and the Monsanto Company. For each, the establishment of new strategies, the refinement of issue management programs, and the pursuit of cooperative approaches to issue management, especially in the environmental areas, will be discussed.
Monsanto Company
Monsanto used to be a capital intensive, largely commodity chemical company. Now, it seeks to be a high value-added company concentrating on proprietary, patented products. According to the company's strategy, its business ultimately will be divided equally among three areas: chemicals, engineered products, and biology-based products.
3
To achieve this turnaround, Monsanto cut costs, realigned its organization, and invested heavily in research. By 1984, about $2 billion in marginal businesses had been divested and the number of employees has been reduced from 64,000 to 51,000 to reduce the firm's break-even point significantly. Two layers of management were eliminated, a matrix management system installed, and decision-making authority more widely distributed.
Such a redirection was bound to have significant cultural implications. Monsanto's Chief Executive Officer Richard J. Mahoney told Fortune magazine that "it has all been a very big cultural shock for people who were accustomed to the way the petrochemical industry has been."4 The company's future will hinge more on brain-power rather than heavy capital investment, more on risk-taking rather than traditional caution. As Fortune noted, Monsanto is far less dependent on outside forces, so the company's managers will have to stretch their talents to keep the company on a steady course to the 1990s.
Corporate staff units, including those with issue management responsibilities, were also part of the corporate redirection effort. Fourteen study teams scrutinized staff functions to see if they were relevant to the "new Monsanto. "5 These staff studies, the major reorganization, and the implementation of the new strategy set the stage for changes in the issue management function.
At the time, Monsanto already enjoyed a national reputation for its programs to identify emerging issues and social trends.6 During 1980 and 1981, an Issue Identification Committee, consisting of 13 key and senior managers, identified 10 broad issues of concern to Monsanto. 7 These issues included global competitive challenges, the management of technology, human resources management, and the management of multinational business. In 1983, they were reviewed again by a Corporate Administrative Committee. A high-level Emerging Issues Committee was also formed to focus top management attention on long-term issues and social trends. This program continues and is an important part of the company's planning process.
With a good system in place to identify critical emerging issues on a long-term basis, in 1983 Mr. Mahoney turned his attention to shorter-term issues. Soon after assuming his duties as CEO, he sought to identify the mechanism used by Monsanto for deciding which issues deserved corporate attention. In particular, he wanted to be sure that he and his fellow senior executives were making the best use of their time in the public issues arena. His concern set in motion a multi-month effort to prioritize the public issues that mattered most to Monsanto, and on which Monsanto could exert the greatest influence. Staff and line units throughout the company were involved, in addition to the top-level Executive Management Committee chaired by Mr. Mahoney.
At the outset, a distinction was drawn between trends and issues. A trend did not have sufficient form or substance to be affected significantly by deliberate outside forces seeking to shape or direct it. An issue, on the other hand, was seen as something that was aüve, had a momentum of its own, and was capable of being modified as it moved toward resolution. As one internal document explained, the distinction was made to ensure that "we don't squander executive time or resources. "
Additional criteria were used to narrow the number of issues considered for top priority status. Included among the criteria was the impact of an issue on the company's assets and business direction. The outcome of the issues also had to be uncertain, making them susceptible to being influenced. As one senior executive asserted, the company should select issues "we can do something about." Finally, the issues had to be active within two years.
The prioritization process began with a cataloguing of the broad universe of issues facing Monsanto. Many issue lists were already being maintained by a number of units, such as government affairs and environmental functions. Experts who deal with issues in different areas across the company also were asked to list the ones they saw as important. A periodically updated Public Issues Book, containing a range of issue summaries, served as a base too. Ultimately, nearly 170 different issues were identified using this "whole universe" approach.
The next step involved sorting and evaluating the issues, in this case on a division-by-division basis. The purpose was to provide managers and planners in each part of the company with a short list of issues keyed to their division's operations. Then, a probability/impact grid was used for each division to identify how each issue could affect the company, and the probability of each issue actually having an impact on Monsanto.
At this point, Mr. Mahoney convened the Executive Management Committee to review the results of the prioritization process and to map-out what the company should do about a select number of top priority issues. After two meetings, the committee decided upon five top corporate issues, assigned resonsibility for each issue to a senior executive, and ordered the development of detailed action plans.
In February 1984, the company newspaper, Monsanto World News, formally announced the selection of "five critical public policy issues" by the Executive Management Committee.8 On the list were fair trade, biotechnology regulation, intellectual property rights, agricultural policy, and hazardous waste/public compensation. Each was closely linked to Monsanto's business position and strategy: fair trade, because the company does business in over 100 countries; biotechnology regulation, because success in the biological sciences is crucial to the new corporate strategy; intellectual property protection, because of the company's reliance on proprietary products; agricultural policy, because the farm-belt is one of the company's principal markets; and hazardous waste/public compensation, because cleanup and potential compensation costs could be quite significant.
These issues were selected, according to then company chairman Louis Fernandez, because the Executive Management Committee decided that there were a handful of issues "so critical to Monsanto's future" that each one should be assigned to a member of the committee for close monitoring and action. He took responsibility for the hazardous waste/public compensation issue and Mr. Mahoney took the assignment for the fair trade issue. Other senior-level executives signed-on to handle the remaining issues. "If we are bold, if we continue battling for our interests with determination and creativity, we will emerge ahead of the pack in terms of our ability to operate smoothly and successfully," asserted Dr. Fernandez at Monsanto's 1984 Management Conference during remarks about the five issues.9
One indication of the close association between issue management at Monsanto and the achievement of Monsanto's strategic objectives is the format used for developing issue action plans. It is the same format used by all management employees to establish the performance goals on which they are evaluated annually. For each issue, specific objectives and action steps are outlined. Performance against the plans is checked routinely and the executives responsible for each issue provide the Executive Management Committee with periodic reports.
Each plan includes activities based on cooperation or coalition building. In connection with agricultural policy, Monsanto founded a Washingtonbased policy project called "Dialogue" to advance discussion among a range of groups of national food, farm, and agricultural policies. Adoption of a leadership role in the National Council for U.S. Trade with China and the U. S. -U. S. S. R. Trade and Economic Council was part of the first fair trade plan. In order to improve protection of intellectual property abroad, the company established coalitions keyed to specific countries. Fair and sensible regulation of biotechnology by the federal government also was a goal of Monsanto coalition-building efforts involving, in this case, work with trade associations, think tanks, public interest groups, and academia.
The greatest reliance on cooperative, coalition-building efforts is occurring in the environmental area, especially with respect to hazardous waste issues. As a result, Dr. Fernandez emerged as a national leader in a growing movement toward constructive dialogue between industry and the environmental community. "I'm going to continue to be involved in anything that will promote dialogue between industry and environmental groups and I'm going to do anything that will promote clean-up of dump sites," he said during one newspaper interview. 10 According to the then President of the National Audubon Society, Dr. Russell W. Peterson, Dr. Fernandez had "certainly demonstrated his willingness to talk and listen."11
The origin of Dr. Fernandez's venture into environmental cooperation can be traced to an essay in the Washington Post by Christopher Palmer of the Audubon Society.
12 When Mr. Palmer suggested that business and environmental groups should seek out areas for compromise and cooperation, Dr. Fernandez responded. In an essay also published by the Post he agreed with Mr. Palmer. 13 Since then, he worked with environmental leaders on projects ranging from wetland protection and hazardous waste clean-up to an increase in the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) research and development budget. In a speech before the Conservation Foundation's Second National Conference on Environmental Dispute Resolution, he proposed the establishment of a forum for regular meetings between senior industry and environmental leaders. 14 His proposal for regular meetings is designed to sustain a series of informal consultations begun last year to identify opportunities for cooperation. One result of these meetings was the joint project on EPA's research budget, which led to a joint appearance earlier this year by Dr. 15 The wetland project occurred within a more structured framework, the National Wildlife Federation's Corporate Conservation Council. Established by Jay Hair, president of the Wildlife Federation, the Council consists of a small group of business leaders, including Dr. Fernandez. The panel meets quarterly with officials of the Wildlife Federation to discuss potentially controversial issues before they reach the public arena. In 1984, Dr. Fernandez joined 11 other members of the Council in issuing a statement calling for the "development of business management plans that will allow the utilization of the valuable resources in wetlands but will also conserve renewable wetlands values in perpetuity.
" 16
By far the most ambitious of the cooperative efforts was Clean Sites, Inc., a partnership between environment groups and industry to help speed the clean-up of hazardous waste sites. 17 The product of discussions spanning the better part of the year, Clean Sites was formally established in May 1984. It had three main functions: to bring together parties involved in waste sites to help them divide up clean-up costs fairly, to assist them in developing clean-up plans that will meet EPA standards, and to manage the clean-up of complex sites. Clean Sites was chaired by former EPA Administrator Russell E. Train and its board of directors consisted of individuals from environmental groups, academia, and industry, including Dr. Fernandez.
Many of the cooperative efforts initiated by Dr. Fernandez got their start during his term as chairman of the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA). The term "creative cooperation" has been used to characterize his initiatives at the head of the organization. According to Robert A. Roland, CMA's president, "he put the association firmly in the path of cooperating with other groups."18 His efforts did not diminish after relinquishing the CMA post. He became a board of trustees member of the Keystone Center, a Colorado-based organization which sponsors consensus-building projects on environmental issues. However, the most significant impact of Dr. Fernandez's efforts at "creative cooperation" may ultimately occur within Monsanto, where some interesting cooperative efforts have occurred. 19 When Ohio Governor Richard Celeste signed a hazardous waste management statute into law in 1984, Monsanto's Gerald Osterman was there, along with representatives of the Sierra Club. Seven months earlier, industry and the environmental community sat down together in Columbus, Ohio, to see if they could agree on the best way for Ohio to amend its hazardous waste law. The measure signed by Governor Celeste emerged from their discussions and won legislative approval without change.
Mr. Osterman was invited to the Ohio signing ceremony because two years earlier he had a lot to do with establishing lines of communication between industry and environmental activists, setting the stage for negotiations on the new hazardous waste management law. "At the beginning, it was a challenge to work with people who see things differently, but after a few meetings we found that we agreed on a surprising number of issues, " said Mr. Osterman, who worked at Monsanto's Port Plastics plant near Cincinnati.
In some states, the use of consensus building already had a successful track record of several years. For example, Monsanto's Pensacola plant considers the development of good relations with local environmental leaders to be the rule, not the exception. Thus, it made sense for Joe Vick, then in the plant's environmental group, to serve on a broad-based groundwater task force convened by Florida's Department of Environmental Regulation. Three years of work by the task force led to groundwater regulation which has been on the books since 1982. In 1984, consensus building proved useful when industry and labor reached agreement on a hazard communication law.
Gulf Oil Corporation
Now a subsidiary of Chevron Corporation, Gulf Oil began its history at the turn of the century with a wildcat oil well called "Spindletop" near Beaumont, Texas. The well produced a gusher on January 10, 1901, and the company's huge Port Arthur refinery ultimately was built nearby to process the crude for sale as gasoline and lubricants. Later, the firm was also the beneficiary of millions of barrels of crude from concessions in Venezuela (1923) and Kuwait (1934) . Refineries, transportation and marketing facilities, and gasoline service stations were built throughout the world to distribute it.
The 1970s brought fundamental changes to Gulf and the petroleum industry. Formerly ample domestic reserves began to decline and Gulf lost its foreign concessions. Then, as the world price for oil shot upward, economic activity slowed down, energy conservation became popular, and petroleum demand softened. Consequently, prices fell, resulting in lower earnings for petroleum companies. Finally, with the removal of federal controls on marketing, the petroleum business became far more competitive. 20
Under Mr. Lee's leadership, the firm sought more control over its future by adopting and pursuing these business goals:
• replace domestic reserves of hydrocarbons through a change in exploration strategy, now to be focused on more risky frontier areas like the Outer Continental Shelf and Alaska; • regain position as a top marketer; • maintain consistent growth in financial position; and • acquire and develop non-petroleum energy resources as economics permit.21
With these goals, Gulf sought to restructure itself in line with the marketplace.
The biggest change at Gulf -prior to its 1984 acquisition by Chevroncame in 1983. The consulting firm McKinsey and Company was hired to help the company find ways to reduce overhead costs. A highly detailed McKinsey exercise called overhead value analysis put much of the company under a microscope. One result was the elimination of over $100 million a year of administrative and overhead costs. The company also sold marginal or unprofitable businesses such as European refining and marketing operations, while investing domestically in new refining equipment. It also made some progress on the exploration front by replacing 60 percent of its U.S. production. 22
Ultimately, Gulf was not able to achieve its turnaround quickly enough. In a white paper issued at the time of its merger with Chevron, Gulf said, "This progress did not significantly affect Gulfs short-term profitability" because the steps were chosen for their long-term effect on future Gulf operations. The paper went on to say that "Gulf stock remained undervalued and the company became the target of a well-financed and aggressive group of speculators.
" 23 Chevron entered as a "white knight" and agreed on March 5, 1984 to acquire Gulf. The later sale of some Gulf marketing assets to Standard of Ohio finalized the merger. Nevertheless, Gulf still serves as a good case to illustrate the evolution of issue management during a period of business redirection. In 1980, before major internal change, the study of long-term social and political trends, and their potential implications, was underway. Experiments were conducted with scenario-generating computer programs, and policy analysts were sent to observe a futures conference in Toronto. Support was also given to futurist projects at SRI International and the University of Southern California. However, by the end of 1983, a Gulf public affairs executive told a regional Public Relations Society of America conference that "we are now rigorously correlating specific business objectives with specific factors in the external environment in setting public affairs strategies."24 He explained that the petroleum marketplace was fiercely competitive and that all elements of a company's performance, including public affairs, were part of the bottomline equation.
In 1981, Gulf began installing a system for identifying and ranking priority issues, and assessing their dollar impact. Undertaken on a strategy center basis, the system had its first implementation in Gulf Oil Chemicals Company (GOCHEM), with a "public issues strategy project."25 Initially, the president of GOCHEM asked more than 70 people to review a preliminary issue list prepared by public affairs, add any issues which had been omitted, and rank the issues by priority. The response ranged from marginal notes on the list to extensive and perceptive memoranda from the field and from headquarters staff.
Evaluation of the project's initial results was a two-step process. First, fifteen members of the survey group were asked to meet with the public affairs staff managing the project to discuss the issues and to agree on issue priority rankings. Those selected to attend the meeting were those who had provided especially insightful comments during the survey or who held particularly important positions. The second step involved presenting the results of the survey and the discussion session to the GOCHEM Executive Committee.
In both cases, the following criteria were used to sort the issues into three priority categories. Category one contained issues which could seriously affect the company's ability to operate effectively, which could probably be influenced by the company's efforts, and about which the company had some expertise. Categories two and three were for issues that deserved to be monitored. They differed only in that the company would be more prepared to act, if necessary, on category two issues. However, almost exclusive attention was meant to be given to category one issues. Once the top issues were selected, GOCHEM's president assigned responsibility for taking action on them to a handful of key executives.
The results of the GOCHEM public issues strategy project, and of similar projects conducted by other strategy centers, were then used by the corporate Public Issues Committee to establish issue priorities based on corporate objectives. The committee consisted of top operating executives and was chaired by the Vice President for Public Affairs. Reporting to the CEO, the committee met routinely to monitor corporate public issue activities and review corporate positions on public issues, as well as to set priorities. All priority issues were then summarized by the Public Affairs Department in an annual publication, "Political and Social Challenges for Gulf."
Among the top priority issues identified by the Public Issues Committee were natural gas decontrol, the leasing of federal lands for energy development, and taxes, each of which related to the corporate objective of increasing energy reserves. Concern over the relationship between petroleum marketing legislation and the goal to be a top marketer put this issue on the top priority list. Environmental issues, especially those involving hazardous waste, public compensation, and the Outer Continental Shelf, completed the top priority list because they were considered to have a role in each of the firm's strategic objectives. 26
At Gulf, the effort to achieve a sharper public affairs focus on corporate business objectives went beyond issue identification and prioritization. The number of states covered by the public affairs field staff was narrowed to just those where the company had marketing or production investments. Moreover, some of these staff people were dispersed from central regional locations to marketing district and refinery offices to enable them to stay on top of rapidly changing market and business conditions. The constituencies with which the company communicated were also reevaluated. Instead of spending great sums on corporate image advertising, where it was difficult to assess results, Gulf devoted more resouces to building grassroots support for its positions, and to developing relationships with important constituencies.
In fact, coalition-building and cooperative efforts were central features of Gulfs public affairs strategies. For example, on the issue of natural gas decontrol, Gulf made effective use of newsletters and direct mail to keep likely supporters informed about key issues and aware of opportunities to communicate with lawmakers. On the other hand, with environmental issues, it sought to maintain a dialogue with environmental and conservation group. These efforts at improved communication and cooperation grew out of a recognition that, in pursuit of corporate objectives, encounters with these groups would be part of exploration efforts near parks and wilderness areas, and of the transportation of products near shorelines. "The outcomes (of these business activities) frequently depend on the quality of our relationship with environmental and conservation groups and most especially on our reputation for good environmental performance, " said one Gulf public affairs executive. 27
To improve its ties with environmental and conservation groups, Gulf launched a "multi-faceted conservation program" based on the following principles:
• Environmental issues should be discussed with the public and lawmakers on environmental grounds, and not solely on the basis of economics.
• Environmental policymaking by our nation must involve cooperation between business and environmentalists.
• Gulf can positively distinguish itself from other petroleum companies on environmental matters. • Gulf will no longer be able to just follow regulations and feel confident that it has done all that it should. 28
The potential of the third premise was demonstrated in 1983 when Gulf became the first corporation to receive the Mountain of Jade award from The Outdoor Writers Association in recognition of its efforts on behalf of conservation and the environment. At that time, Mr. Lee asserted that "if government, business, and involved citizens can cooperate, I am convinced we can have the best of both worlds -a clean, healthy, and beautiful environment and commercial and business prosperity.
"29
The flagship of Gulfs realtionship-building effort is the Gulf Oil Conservation Awards Program, with which Gulf became associated in 1982. Considered by many to be the premier awards program for conservationists, it had been sponsored since 1954 by the American Motors Corporation. It opened the doors of the conservation community to Gulf and helped the firm distinguish itself as a leader in environmental and conservation matters. Leaders of conservation organizations and federal environmental agencies recommend candidates for the awards and attend an annual ceremony in Washington where the awards are conferred.
Gulf also demonstrates its commitment to nature preservation in a substantial way each year through a major contribution to a specific project in a state critical to Gulfs future. In 1982, Gulf served as a pacesetter for a $250,000 program to protect the White Rocks Nature Area near Boulder, Colorado. The director of the Nature Conservancy told the Denver Post that "Gulf has been one of the Conservancy's most valued backers."30 In 1981, North Dakota's Cross Ranch was the beneficiary of this Gulf program. There, its grant was part of a $2. 7 million Nature Conservancy drive to purchase the ranch, which included the largest one-owner natural stretch of the Missouri River. "Gulf has been a major part [of the Ranch Preservation effort] and we appreciate it, " said the director of the Nature Conservancy's North Dakota Field Office.31 On a larger scale, Gulfs support of National Geographic television specials and a travelling "Birds in Art" exhibition affiliated with the Leigh Yawkey Woodson Art Museum in Wausau, Wisconsin, demonstrated the firm's association with the support for nature appreciation and protection. Special previews of each season's National Geographic specials were staged for environmental and conservation leaders in Washington, San Francisco, and New York. Many of these same leaders were invited to special showings of the "Birds in Art" exhibition, which was also popular with the public. For example, in Pittsburgh, more than 12,000 persons viewed the exhibit in 1982 and a special feature on it appeared in the Pittsburgh Press Sunday magazine. 32
Finally, Gulf supported projects that seek to bridge the gap between industry, the environmental community, and government, both nationally and internationally. The firm was a major sponsor of the Keystone Center in Colorado. The president of GOCHEM served as chairman of Keystone's Board of Trustees. Internationally, Mr. Lee was a convenor of The World Industry Conference on Environmental Management, sponsored by the United Nation's Environment Program, the International Chamber of Commerce, and the Business Roundtable. In 1984, the Conference in Paris provided a forum where industry and government discussed more effective approaches to environmental problem solving. Mr. Lee saw the conference as an opportunity for industry, government, and environmentalists to enlarge their common ground and reduce confrontation. "I believe it's one way to identify some promising areas of potential consensus in the future, " said Mr. Lee. 33
Conclusion
The case histories of Gulf and Monsanto argue that new trends may be emerging in corporate issue management, largely as a result of corporate repositions during 1980s. One trend appears to be moving in the direction of greater competitive focus for the issue management function. The other appears to be moving toward greater reliance on cooperative and coalitionbuilding strategies for the management of issues. Rather than being contradictory, the two trends are in fact complementary. By harnessing issue management to the achievement of corporate objectives -in a competitive sense -firms have found both the need and the ability to form coalitions and cooperative ventures in order to achieve their goals. Monolithic positions on issues such as the relative roles of government and the private sector have given way to practical, cooperative attempts to address problems underlying specific issues. Taken together, the two trends constitute an approach to issue management which can be called competitive cooperation.
Reviewing the two cases, we find that both Monsanto and Gulf underwent major strategic redirections during the early 1980s. In an effort to exert more control over their destinies in the face of external forces, they each adopted bold, risky strategies. Monsanto decided to bet on its research ability where it had special expertise to produce the high value-added products on which it plans to concentrate. The firm's goal is to divide its business equally among three areas: chemicals, engineered products, and biology-based products. Gulf concluded that it had to stake its future on discovering large reserves of petroleum in the United States, especially on the Outer Continental Shelf. It also began to make the tough decisions necessary to regain a top position as a marketer of petroleum products.
In addition to defining their goals explicity, both companies thoroughly evaluated whether their current organizations were structured to achieve those goals. This evaluation involved both line and staff units, including those functions with issue management duties. Monsanto divested businesses, reduced costs, and implemented a matrix management system. Gulf also divested businesses and invested more funds in exploration and in improved refining capacity. However, for issue management in both companies, staff studies also had an impact. At Monsanto, study teams assessed whether functions were relevant to the "new Monsanto." At Gulf, the McKinsey Company's overhead value analysis tested whether each function's missions, activities, and "products" were necessary for the achievement of the corporation's strategic goals.
Issue management survived the intense scrutiny. In fact, for both companies, it emerged as a more crucial factor in the achievement of corporate goals. Some might even say that it had become too important to be left solely in the hands of the issue managers. Top-level corporate executives and business managers began to assume a more direct, hands-on role in issue management. However, this increased importance led to changes in the issue management function. At Monsanto, focus was placed on issues "we can do something about, " that is, issues which are active in the short term, in addition to long-range trends which could not be significantly affected by corporate actions. At Gulf, more attention was given to "rigorously correlating specific business objectives with specific factors in the external environment. " In both cases, possibly because of the involvement of line management and the desire to influence issues so that corporate objectives could be achieved, the issues had to be "actionable, " to use a term often heard in executive suites. The mechanisms used by Gulf and Monsanto to identify priority issues, such as surveys, discussion groups, and priority/impact grids, were not especially novel. The extensive involvement of top-level executives, however, could represent a departure. Monsanto's Executive Management Committee met twice to finalize its list of top-priority issues. Then, members of the committee took personal responsibility for developing action plans, including the Chief Executive Officer and the Chairman of the Board. At Gulf, a Public Issues Committee met regularly to assess issue priorities and to monitor action programs.
With such involvement of top executives and business managers in issue management programs, it probably should come as no surprise that familiar problem-solving techniques were applied to the task. The careful linkage of issue priorities to corporate objectives and the development of action plans to make the firm more competitive is an everyday process. The same is true for the use of cooperation and coalition building because practical, negotiated solutions to problems are mainstays of business success. Therefore, such strategies are important elements of each company's issue management action plans. It is one of the principles of Gulfs environmental program and Dr. Fernandez has asserted that "cooperation is the practical way to go for industry and the environmental community.
"34
Thus, competitive cooperation is not really new. What is new is the extensive involvement of business leaders in the work of issue management. Dr. Fernandez may have put his finger on what is happening when he addressed the Chemical Manufacturers Association at the close of his term as chairman of the group. "I would argue, " he said, "that we must manage, as business people managing business problems, the delicate task of bringing these issues to the public arena."35
